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ABSTRACT
Users often join an online social networking (OSN) site, like Facebook, to remain
social, by either staying connected with friends or expanding social networks. On an
OSN site, users generally share variety of personal information which is often expected
to be visible to their friends, but sometimes vulnerable to unwarranted access from
others. The recent study suggests that many personal attributes, including religious
and political affiliations, sexual orientation, relationship status, age, and gender, are
predictable using users’ personal data from an OSN site. The majority of users
want to remain socially active, and protect their personal data at the same time.
This tension leads to a user’s vulnerability, allowing privacy attacks which can cause
physical and emotional distress to a user, sometimes with dire consequences. For
example, stalkers can make use of personal information available on an OSN site to
their personal gain. This dissertation aims to systematically study a user vulnerability
against such privacy attacks.
A user vulnerability can be managed in three steps: (1) identifying, (2) measur-
ing and (3) reducing a user vulnerability. Researchers have long been identifying
vulnerabilities arising from user’s personal data, including user names, demographic
attributes, lists of friends, wall posts and associated interactions, multimedia data
such as photos, audios and videos, and tagging of friends. Hence, this research first
proposes a way to measure and reduce a user vulnerability to protect such personal
data. This dissertation also proposes an algorithm to minimize a user’s vulnerability
while maximizing their social utility values.
To address these vulnerability concerns, social networking sites like Facebook
usually let their users to adjust their profile settings so as to make some of their data
invisible. However, users sometimes interact with others using unprotected posts (e.g.,
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posts from a “Facebook page1”). Such interactions help users to become more social
and are publicly accessible to everyone. Thus, visibilities of these interactions are
beyond the control of their profile settings. I explore such unprotected interactions
so that users’ are well aware of these new vulnerabilities and adopt measures to
mitigate them further. In particular, are users’ personal attributes predictable using
only the unprotected interactions? To answer this question, I address a novel problem
of predictability of users’ personal attributes with unprotected interactions. The
extreme sparsity patterns in users’ unprotected interactions pose a serious challenge.
Therefore, I approach to mitigating the data sparsity challenge by designing a novel
attribute prediction framework using only the unprotected interactions. Experimental
results on Facebook dataset demonstrates that the proposed framework can predict
users’ personal attributes.
1The term ”Facebook page“ refers to the page which are commonly dedicated for businesses,
brands and organizations to share their stories and connect with people.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Social networking sites, such as Facebook and GooglePlus, have gained popularity
in recent years, becoming an integral part of our lives. They enable users to remain
social by expanding their ways of communications in sharing news, expressing senti-
ments, exchanging opinions, and making online friends. However with the presence
of adversaries, the convenience of and low barriers of access to social networking sites
bring about new challenges.
When a user joins a social networking site to remain social, she also expects
the protection of personal information from an unwarranted access. This tension
leads to a user’s vulnerability, allowing myriads of privacy attacks. Vulnerability can
cause physical and emotional distress to users, sometimes with dire consequences.
For example, Facebook founder is a victim of stalking and has publicly admitted to
emotional distress1. In a more serious case of cyberstalking, a perpetrator trolled
women’s Facebook pages searching for clues that allowed him to take over their email
accounts2. Furthermore, an unwarranted access to personal data on a social network-
ing site can aid not only the cyberbullying of teenagers but also the cyberstalking
and cyberharassment of adults3.
On a social networking site, an individual user can share a large amount of personal
information through channels such as the user’s profile, frequent status updates, and
1http://www.tmz.com/2011/02/07/mark-zuckerberg-restraining-order-facebook-
social-network-santa-clara-county-stalker-letters-priscilla-chan
2http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-07-23-facebook-stalker-
sentenced_n.htm
3en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberbullying
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posts and subsequent interactions. The owner of the site (Facebook, for example)
stores such personal information, whereas some (Facebook) users, including friends,
has direct access to it. From a user’s vulnerability point of view, this gives rise to
two types of concerns. First, sometimes the owner of the site sells the personal data
to the third party users, including advertising agencies, for generating more revenue.
Second, inadequate privacy mechanisms expose the personal data to an unwarranted
access from the malicious users and applications (apps). The focus of this dissertation
is exclusively on the second concern, whereas previous research on privacy-preserving
data-mining [23] proposes different techniques to address the first concern.
To alleviate the vulnerabilities, users are often left with profile settings to mark
their personal data, including demographic profiles, status updates, lists of friends,
videos, photos, and interactions on posts, invisible to others. Also, the amount of
shared information varies for different users. Active users generally share more infor-
mation whereas inactive users share less information. Based on profile settings and
amount of available information, users can be categorized into four types: (1) active
users with public settings, (2) active users with private settings, (3) inactive users with
public settings, and (4) inactive users with private settings. Figure 1.1 shows users’
classification into four quadrants. Users in quadrant one (Q1 users) generally pro-
vides maximum amount of personal information including usernames, demographic
attributes, lists of friends, posts and associated interactions, and tagging of friends.
In comparison with Q1 users, inactive users in quadrant four (Q4 users) provides less
amount of information. Usernames, demographic attributes, and lists of friends are
generally available from Q4 users. Users in quadrant two (Q2 users) are trying to be
social at the same time marking their profile setting private to secure their personal
data. New mechanisms such as Facebook page allow Q2 users to interact through
posts without requiring them to be friends, while keeping their personal information,
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Figure 1.1: User Types based on Available Information
including demographic profiles, lists of friends, and interactions with friends, private.
Users’ interactions on these pages are often centrally administered and publicly avail-
able for everyone. Based on whether a user can control the visibility of her actions, a
post can be categorized into two parts: personal or public post. Personal post is a post
which can be controlled by a user’s individual profile settings, otherwise it is referred
as a public post. Q2 users often provides usernames, and public posts and associated
interactions. The least amount of information is available for users in quadrant three
(Q3 users). For a Facebook user, username is the minimum available information.
Based on the literature survey, there are three steps to manage one’s vulnerability:
(1) identifying, (2) measuring and (3) reducing a user vulnerability. Hence for each
of the four types of user, the vulnerability can be managed by addressing these three
steps separately. Since active users generously provide information on an OSN site,
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this dissertation mainly focuses on active users (i.e., Q1 and Q2 users). Researchers
have long been identifying the privacy attacks associated with Q1 users, whereas
Q2 users are mostly unexplored. Hence, this dissertation focuses on measuring and
reducing Q1 users’ vulnerabilities. Furthermore, dissertation also predicts the Q2
users’ personal attributes using their interactions on the public posts. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first attempt to identify Q2 users’ vulnerabilities.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a
novel way to measure vulnerabilities of Q1 users, and proposes a mechanism to reduce
them further. Chapter 3 identifies the Q2 users’ vulnerabilities using interactions
on the public posts. Experiments in both Chapters are performed on the large-
scale Facebook datasets. A brief literature review is provided in Chapter 4. Finally,
conclusion and future work is outlined in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
MANAGING VULNERABILITY OF ACTIVE USERS WITH PUBLIC
SETTINGS
In this chapter, my focus is on active users which mark majority of their profile
settings public (i.e., Q1 users). Such users on a social networking site can choose
to reveal their personal information using user-names, some demographic attributes,
wall-posts and their associated interactions (e.g., likes, comments, reply and shares),
lists of friends, and tagging of friends. Researchers have shown that users’ personal
information could be used in predicting the personal attributes and traits, including
gender, age, location, religious and political affiliations, relationship status, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, educational level, social ties, parental separation, openness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Chapter 4 reviews
the literature on identifying a user’s vulnerability arising from the publicly available
information. As different users expose to such privacy attacks differently, this Chapter
focuses on (1) measuring a user vulnerability, and (2) provide a way to mitigate it. For
the rest of this Chapter, active users with public profile settings are simply referred
as users, unless otherwise stated.
In this chapter, I show that it is feasible to measure a user’s vulnerability based on
three factors: (1) user privacy settings can reveal personal information; (2) a user’s
action on a social networking site can expose their friends’ personal information; and
(3) friends’ action on a social networking site can reveal user’s personal informa-
tion. Based on these three factors, I later show that how user’s vulnerability can be
measured and assessed. This vulnerability measure enables me to quantify users vul-
nerability, and identify their vulnerable friends. As we draw parallels between users
5
AA
C
B
U
D
E
F
H
G
Figure 2.1: Which One Vulnerable Friend to Unfriend from (A,B,C) for User U?
and their friends, I am interested in finding an effective mechanism that could make
users less vulnerable. Unfriending with vulnerable friends reduces users vulnerability.
This mechanism has been validated using extensive experiments on users and their
friends on Facebook.
Sociologists, psychologists and economists [58, 76, 7, 8] have been researching
the impact of social interactions on the social utility value of a user and the society.
Although unfriending vulnerable friends can reduce vulnerability, this simple strategy
can limit social interaction opportunities among users. Besides limiting interaction
opportunities, unfriending socially important or valuable friends can backfire and
reduce one’s social status as well. Social importance can be measured in terms of social
utility [48]. One such utility is the nodal degree of a friend. Refer to Figure 2.1: if A
is the most vulnerable but also most popular among U ’s friends, could U unfriend his
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other vulnerable friends instead of A in order to reduce vulnerability? Herewith, the
additional new challenge is how to maintain low vulnerability and high social utility
for a social networking user. The work in this chapter addresses the challenge by
developing novel solutions to the following questions without suggesting any structural
change to a social networking site.
1. How can we measure and assess user’s vulnerability? Is there an effective mech-
anism to make users less vulnerable?
2. What is the social cost of vulnerability reduction mechanism on user’s social
utility ? How can we achieve balance between user’s vulnerability and social
utility?
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 studies the collectible
statistics from a social networking site and present a quantifiable measure to evaluate
users vulnerability and define the problem of identifying vulnerable friends [32]. Sec-
tion 2.2 proposes a methodology and measures for evaluating whether or not a user is
vulnerable and how to adjust a user’s network to best deal with threats presented by
vulnerable friends [32]. Section 2.3 presents a constrained vulnerability minimization
problem. To this end, I formulate two novel optimization problems of vulnerability
minimization. I also discuss the hardness of the problem and provide approximation
guarantees to efficient algorithms [33]. Section 2.4 conducts an empirical study to
evaluate methods that can be manipulated to make users less vulnerable, compare
the performance of an optimal algorithm with that of intuitive heuristic methods, and
discuss the approach that can be used to assess the impact of new friends to a user’s
network. I also evaluate methods that make users less vulnerable while retaining
acceptable level of social utility values of vulnerable friends. Finally, I summarize the
chapter with possible future research directions in Section 2.5.
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2.1 Measuring User Vulnerability
Every user on a social networking site can choose to reveal their personal infor-
mation using a range of attributes. Figure 2.1 shows an illustrative example where a
user U has eight friends (A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H). Based on their preferences, friends
assumed to be revealing different attributes from the available lists of personal at-
tributes. In this section, I propose a measure to quantify user U ’s vulnerability. I
first divide the user’s personal attributes into two sets, individual and community
attributes. Individual attributes (I-attributes) characterize individual user informa-
tion, including personal information such as gender, birth date, phone number, home
address, group memberships, etc. Community attributes (C-attributes) characterize
information about friends of a user, including friends that are traceable from a user’s
profile (i.e., user’s friend list), tagged pictures, wall interactions, etc. These attributes
are always accessible to friends but may not to the other users. A user’s vulnerability
depends on the visibility and exposure of a user’s profile through not only attributes
settings but also his friends.
Oftentimes users on a social networking site are unaware that they could pose a
threat to their friends due to their vulnerability. In this chapter, I show that it is
feasible to measure a user’s vulnerability based on three factors: (1) user’s privacy
settings that can reveal personal information; (2) a user’s action on a social networking
site that can expose their friends’ personal information; and (3) friends’ action on a
social networking site that can reveal user’s personal information. Based on these
factors, I formally present one of the earliest models for vulnerability reduction.
Definition 1 (I-index) I-index estimates how much risk to privacy a user can incur
by allowing individual attributes to be accessible or visible to other users. A user who
ignores or is unaware of privacy settings is a threat to himself. I-index is defined as
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a function of individual attributes (I-attributes). I-index of user u is given by
Iu = f(Au), (2.1)
where Iu ∈ [0, 1] , Au = {au,i|∀i, au,i ∈ {0, 1}} is I-attribute set for user u, and au,i
is a status of a i-th I-attribute for a user u. au,i = 1 indicates user u has enabled
i-th I-attribute to be visible to everyone otherwise non-visible (may be sensitive for a
user). Note a user attribute visible to only friends is marked as disabled.
Table 2.2 shows statistics of commonly found I-attributes on Facebook (Refer to
Section 2.4.1 for details on Facebook dataset consists of 2,056,646 users). The last
column in the table lists the percentage of people who enable the particular attribute
to be visible. For example, 7,430 (0.36%) Facebook users enabled their mobile phone
numbers to be visible. I define the sensitivity (weight), of an attribute as a percentage
of non-visibility. Hence, the sensitivity of a mobile phone number according to the
proposed Facebook dataset is 99.64. This means that users do not usually disclose
their mobile phone number to other users. Users that do disclose phone numbers
have a propensity to vulnerability because they disclose more sensitive information
in their profiles.
I used normalized weighted average to estimate I-index. I-index for each profile
user u is given by,
Iu = f(Au) =
∑n
i=1wi ∗ au,i∑n
i=1wi
, (2.2)
where wi is the sensitivity (weight) of an i-th I-attribute, n is the total number of
I-attributes available via a social networking site profile and au,i = 1 if i-th I-attribute
is visible otherwise the attribute is not visible (i.e., sensitive to user u). Iu ∈ [0, 1].
Iu = 1 indicates user u has marked all I-attributes to be visible. On the other hand,
Iu = 0 indicates user u has marked all I-attributes to be non-visible.
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Attributes Users # Per (%)
I-attributes:
Current City 620,401 30.17
Hometown 727,674 35.38
Gender 1,681,673 81.77
Birthday 67,834 3.30
Relationship status 539,612 26.24
Siblings 244,658 11.90
Education and work 516,848 25.13
Like and interests 1,369,080 66.57
Email 27,103 1.32
Mobile number 7,430 0.36
Website 128,776 6.26
Home address 7,580 0.37
Political Views 24,438 1.19
Religious Views 33,036 1.61
Attributes User # Per (%)
Children 86,609 4.21
Networks 284,482 13.83
Parents 73,887 3.49
Bio 199,070 9.68
Interested in 383,724 18.66
Looking for 449,498 21.86
Music 941,340 45.77
Books 281,346 13.68
Movies 574,243 27.92
Television 684,843 33.30
Activities 385,417 18.74
Interests 308,229 14.99
C-attributes:
Friends trace 1,481,472 72.03
Total users 2,056,646
Figure 2.2: Attributes Statistics of Facebook Dataset.
From the viewpoint of optimization, it is common to use linear sum as an objec-
tive function or constraints to reduce the overall complexity of finding the optimal
solution (e.g. Linear Programming). Inspired from this, the chapter proposes a linear
sum (weighted average) function of individual attributes and their sensitivity weight
(percentage of non-visibility) to compute the I-index of a user (Equation (2.2)). The
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proposed linear sum function is a simple, and captures the intuition that vulnerability
of a user increases with more visibility of some attributes. For example, Table 2.2
shows that the profile revealing “religious (1.61%)” and “political (1.19%)” affiliation
values should be more vulnerable in comparison with the profile revealing “Gender
(81.77%)” and “Relationship status (26.24%)” values.
Definition 2 (C-index) C-index estimates how much threat a user can pose to their
friends by making community attributes accessible or visible to other users. Users who
ignore and are unaware of privacy settings of community attributes can create risk
to the entire community of friends. C-index is defined as a function of community
attributes (C-attributes). C-index for a user u is given by
Cu = g(Bu), (2.3)
where Cu ∈ [0, 1] , Bu = {bu,i|∀i, bu,i ∈ Z+} is C-attributes set for user u, bu,i indicates
the number of friends affected when a corresponding C-attribute is manifested, and
Z+ is the set of positive integers. I ignore attributes marked as non-visible. The
Facebook dataset has only one C-attribute (see Table 2.2) which suggests how many
friends are traceable (via a friend relationship) from an individual user. 1,481,472
(72.03%) Facebook users in the dataset allowed friends to trace to other users. Thus,
a large portion of users are either not careful or not aware of the privacy concerns of
their friends.
A vulnerable user, u, can pose threat to his friends. The amount of the threat
increases with the number of friends that are put at risk. However, the rate of the
increment decreases as more friends are put at risk. To appropriately represent this
threat change, I choose a convex, non-decreasing log function to estimate the threat
for each user based on the number friends placed at risk by each C-attribute. Hence,
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(a) I-index (Red) and C-index (Blue) (b) P-index (Red) and V-index (Blue)
Figure 2.3: Relationship Among Index Values for Each User.
C-index for a user u is calculated as
Cu = g(Bu) =
∑m
i=1 log(bu,i)
4 ∗m , (2.4)
where m is the total number of C-attributes possible on a social networking site, and
constant 4 is chosen because Cu ∈ [0, 1] and none of the Facebook users in the dataset
has more than 104 friends. Cu > 0 indicates user u has allowed everyone to trace
friends through their own profile. On the other hand, Cu = 0 indicates that all the
friends (except one) of a user u are non-traceable through a profile.
Fig. 2.3a shows I-index and C-index for randomly chosen 100K Facebook users.
Note that users are sorted in ascending order of their I-indexes which gives curve-
like impression on plotting I-index. The X-axis and Y-axis indicate users and their
corresponding I and C-index values, respectively. Fig. 2.3a demonstrates that for the
majority of users, the C-index value is greater than the corresponding I-index value.
This highlights the one finding of this chapter that a large portion of users are either
not careful or not aware of the privacy concerns of their friends.
Definition 3 (P-index) It estimates how public (visible) or private (non-visible) a
user is on a social networking site. It shows how much an individual user aims to
protect himself as well as his friends. P-index is defined as a function of I-index and
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C-index. P-index of user u is given by
Pu = j(Iu, Cu), (2.5)
where Pu ∈ [0, 1].
I choose a simple, weighted average function to calculate P-index for each Face-
book user in the dataset.
Pu = α ∗ Iu + (1− α) ∗ Cu = α ∗ f(Au) + (1− α) ∗ g(Bu), (2.6)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting Eq(2.6) with Eq(2.2) and Eq(2.4), I get
Pu = α ∗
∑n
i=1wi ∗ au,i∑n
i=1wi
+ (1− α) ∗
∑m
i=1 log(bu,i)
4 ∗m (2.7)
Different users may have different priorities about friends and may have different
perspectives about vulnerability. Tunable parameter α can be set to address the
needs of different users. For example, one may choose α < 0.5 to deemphasize the
individual attributes’ visibility; or one may choose α > 0.5 to emphasize the individual
attributes’ visibility. For experiments, I set α = 0.5 to put equal weights to individual
and community attributes.
The P-index address the first two factors of the user vulnerability estimation
discussed above, i.e., user’s privacy settings (I-index) and actions to expose friends
(C-index). Thus, I follow a commonly used optimization formulation as in linear
program as I did for I-index. Mathematically, any function which can combine the
I-index and C-index and ranges between [0,1] can be used. In this chapter, the above
simple weighted average function works well and it can also be easily discerned in
applying these indices for various needs.
Definition 4 (V-index) V-index estimates how vulnerable a user is on a social net-
working site. Thus far, I have provided three indexes, I-index, C-index, and P-index,
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for a user based on the visibility of I-attributes and C-attributes. Vulnerability of a
user depends on privacy settings of self, friends, their friends, and so on. Intuitively,
as the distance between a user and other users on a social networking site increases,
the marginal risk of vulnerability decreases the further away a user is from a vulnera-
ble user. Hence, I only consider a user and friends in estimating the vulnerability of
a user. V-index of a user depends on the P-indexes of friends and him. V-index of
user u is defined as
Vu = h(PFu∪{u}), (2.8)
where Fu is the set of friends of user u, PFu∪{u} = {Pi|i ∈ Fu ∪ {u}}, and Vu ∈ [0, 1].
I rewrite the above notation without loss of generality as,
Vu = h(Fu ∪ {u}) (2.9)
Figure 2.3b shows the P-index and V-index for 100K randomly chosen users (the
same users chosen for Figure 2.3a). Note that users are sorted in ascending order
of their P-indexes which gives curve-like impression on plotting P-index. The X-axis
and Y-axis indicate users and their index values respectively. A simple, weighted
average function is used to plot V-index for each user,
Vu =
Pu +
∑
i∈Fu Pi
|Fu|+ 1 (2.10)
The design of V-index function has a direct impact on the complexity of solving
the problem of identifying ’k’ vulnerable friends (described in detail next). I later
show that this problem can be solved in polynomial time, if the V-index is computed
as shown in Equation ( 2.10).
2.2 Reducing User Vulnerability
Next, I will provide the mechanism based on unfriending to reduce user vulnera-
bility.
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Definition 5 (A vulnerable friend) A user’s vulnerable friend is defined as a friend
whose unfriending will lower the V-index score of a user. The V-index of a user u
upon removing the vulnerable friend v is given by
V ′u = h(Fu ∪ {u} \ {v}) (2.11)
By the definition of a vulnerable friend, V ′u < Vu.
The definition of a vulnerable friend can be generalized to k-vulnerable friends.
Definition 6 (k-vulnerable friends) k-vulnerable friends of a user are k friends
whose unfriending will lower the V-index score of a user. The V-index of user, u,
upon removing k vulnerable friends {v1, · · · , vk} is given by
V ′u = h(Fu ∪ {u} \ {v1, · · · , vk}), (2.12)
By the definition of k-vulnerable friends, V ′u < Vu.
Based on Definitions 5 and 6, a user’s friends can be divided into two sets: (1) an
initial set of vulnerable friends Du,0, who are responsible for increasing the V-index
value of user u, and (2) a set of non-vulnerable friends Fu \Du,0, who are responsible
for decreasing the V-index value of user u. Hence, Eq(2.9) can be rewritten as
Vu = h({Fu \Du,0} ∪ {u} ∪Du,0) (2.13)
In order to minimize the user vulnerability1 function h(·), I have to unfriend
vulnerable friends Du,0. The user vulnerability minimization problem seeks, for a
parameter k from user u, to find a new set of k vulnerable friends Du ⊆ Du,0 to
1A user vulnerability can also be minimized by (1) disabling visibility of sensitive user’s attributes
(such as phone number, email address, home address, etc.) and not exposing friends to others; and
by (2) requesting (or negotiating with) the vulnerable friends to lower their vulnerability index.
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unfriend. The minimum new V-index for user u is achieved after unfriending the
selected vulnerable friends Du, where |Du| ≤ k. The new V-index of user, u, upon
removing selected set of vulnerable friends Du ⊆ Du,0, is given by
V ′u = h({Fu \Du,0} ∪ {u} ∪ {Du,0 \Du}) (2.14)
By the definition of k-vulnerable friends, V ′u < Vu.
This problem of minimizing the vulnerability of user u is equivalently stated as
finding the set of at most k vulnerable friends Du ⊆ Du,0 to unfriend, who are
responsible for maximizing the vulnerability of user u.
Let σ(Du) be the estimate how vulnerable user u is due to vulnerable friends
Du. Thus, I maximize function σ : 2
|Du,0| → R∗, where R∗ is the set of non-negative
real numbers. Note that, h(Du) is not the same as σ(Du), even though function
σ(·) depends on function h(·). For example, if h(·) is a simple average function of
P-indexes of user and friends, then function σ(·) estimates the total P-index value of
all the vulnerable friends. In other words, function σ(Du) estimates the vulnerability
induced by the vulnerable friends Du on user u. The Vulnerability Maximization with
Cardinality constraint problem (VMC) is formulated as follows
VMC(Du,0, ~P , k, Vu) - Instance: The finite set of initial vulnerable friends Du,0 ⊆ Fu
of user u, P-index Pi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ Du,0, a vector ~P = (P1, · · · , P|Du,0|), and constant
k ∈ Z∗ and Vu ∈ R∗. Question: Is there a subset Du ⊆ Du,0 such that |Du| ≤ k and
σ(Du) ≥ Vu ?
The above problem can be solved in polynomial time, if function σ(·) is a linear
function of P-index values of vulnerable friends. The linear function σ(·) can be
represented as,
σ(Du,0) =
|Du,0|∑
i=1
λi ∗ Pi, ∀i ∈ Du,0, λi ∈ R∗ (2.15)
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Since vulnerable friends make a user profile less secure, λi cannot be a negative
real number. For Eq(2.15), the most vulnerable friend d ∈ Du,0 is given by,
d = max
v∈Du,0
σ(Du,0) = max
i
{λi ∗ Pi|∀i ∈ Du,0} (2.16)
If I repetitively identify the most vulnerable friend d, using Eq(2.16), for k (or n,
if n < k) times and remove d from Du,0 for every run, I can get k-vulnerable friends
to maximally reduce user vulnerability.
I do not assume that σ(·) is linear. Later, I will discuss how to solve VMC
problem, when σ(·) is non-linear.
So far I aim to reduce the vulnerability of a user without considering its social
impact. If the vulnerable user selected to unfriend is also socially valuable, then it
could lead to a serious social problem. For example, a user may not want to unfriend
his girlfriend, though vulnerable. Next I investigate this problem of user vulnerability
reduction with social utility constraints.
2.3 Reducing User Vulnerability with Social Utility
An essential function of social networking sites is to help users to be social. Al-
though unfriending vulnerable friends from a user’s social network sometimes can
reduce vulnerability, this strategy could sometimes significantly limit social interac-
tion among users.
The social utility can be defined by different measures of social network analysis.
In this work, I use three basic measures: nodal degree or simply degree, tie strength,
and number of common friends. A friend with high degree means she is a popular one;
when two friends have a strong tie [25] or have a large number of common friends, they
are very close friends. In other words, I can employ these measures help determine
the consequence of unfriending on a user. Unfriending a vulnerable friend with high
17
Vulnerable friends P-index Degree Tie Strength #Common Friends
A 0.9 100 0.8 30
B 0.7 200 0.5 50
C 0.5 300 0.3 10
Table 2.1: Unfriending One Vulnerable Friend from (A,B,C) to Minimize User U ’s
Vulnerability while Retaining Socially Valuable Friends. A High P-index Suggests
High Vulnerability. Social Utility can be Materialized in Various Forms. In This
Work, I Use Three Common Measures: One’s Nodal Degree, Tie Strength, and Num-
ber of Common Friends.
degree could limit the user’s potential to make more friends, which makes user more
reclusive and defeats the purpose of social networking. Generally, family members,
best friends, and girl or boy friend are examples of strong ties. Though unfriending
them could reduce one’s vulnerability, it would not be desirable. When the user and
his friend share a large number of friends, removing the friend could affect structural
balance [20] of the social network and the user’s clustering coefficient [78]. Thus, it
is essential to consider the social utility of vulnerable friends before unfriending them
in order to reduce vulnerability.
There exist many social utility measures that can be categorized into two types [4]:
(1) social utility measures related to the vulnerable friends, and (2) social utility
measures related to the relationship between user and each of his vulnerable friends.
Table 2.2 lists some social utility measures available for a user u to consider while
selecting the vulnerable friends Du ⊆ Du,0 to unfriend. Figure 2.1 shows an illus-
trative example where a user U has three vulnerable friends (A,B,C). Table 2.1
lists users P-indexes (indicating user visibility) and their social utility measures in-
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cluding degree, tie strength and number of common friends. If I do not consider the
social utility measures of vulnerable friends, the most vulnerable friend A should be
removed to minimize user U ’s vulnerability. If I consider tie strength, user A is the
most valuable for user U . Similarly, friends B and C are also valuable because B
shares the most number of common friends and C has the highest degree. Under
these different circumstances, I now study which friend U should unfriend in order to
reduce vulnerability with the constraint of retaining social utility.
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Social utility
measures related
to the initial set
of vulnerable
friends Du,0 of a
user u.
Degree (number of friends) of a vulnerable friend.
Local clustering coefficient (density) of a vulnerable friend.
Number of closed triads of a vulnerable friend.
Number of open triads of a vulnerable friend.
Number of posts (social activity) by a vulnerable friend.
Number of responses (social activity) by a vulnerable friend.
Popularity (may be based on replies on posts) of a vulnerable friend.
Influence index of a vulnerable friend.
Social utility
measures
related to the
relationship
between user u
and each
vulnerable
friend in Du,0
Number of common friends between user and vulnerable friend.
Tie strength between user and vulnerable friend.
Number of uncommon friends between user and vulnerable friend.
Number of responses (social activity) by a user u on a vulnerable
friend’s post.
Number of responses (social activity) by a vulnerable friend on a
user’s post.
Homophily (similarity) index between user and a vulnerable friend.
Table 2.2: Types of Social Utility Measures
Next I define the optimization problem for reducing a user vulnerability while
retaining socially valuable friends.
Definition 7 (Social Utility Loss) It estimates how much a user loses on a social
networking site after unfriending friends. Social utility loss of user u depends on
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social utility values of u’s friends. For a given social utility measure, the social utility
loss for a user u after unfriending with a given set of friends A ⊆ Fu is given by
Lu = ζ(SA), (2.17)
where SA = {Si|i ∈ A ⊆ Fu, Si ∈ R∗}, Si represents the social utility measure of user
i, and Lu ∈ R∗.
Assuming ζ(·) to be a simple additive function, I have
Lu =
∑
i∈A⊆Fu
Si (2.18)
Similar to the VMC problem formulation, the problem of minimizing the vulner-
ability of user u with social utility constraint can be stated as finding the set of at
most k vulnerable friends Du ⊆ Du,0 to unfriend, who are responsible for maximiz-
ing the user vulnerability, and minimizing user u’s social utility loss. I can formally
state the problem of Vulnerability Maximization with minimum social Utility loss
and Cardinality constraint (VMUC) as
VMUC(Du,0, ~P , ~S, k, Vu, Lu): - Instance: Given a finite set of initial vul-
nerable friends Du,0 ⊆ Fu of a user u, P-index Pi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ Du,0, a vector
~P = (P1, · · · , P|Du,0|), social utility measure Si ∈ R∗ ∀i ∈ Du,0, a vector ~S =
(S1, · · · , S|Du,0|), and constants k ∈ Z∗, Vu ∈ R∗, and Lu ∈ R∗. - Question: Find
a subset Du ⊆ Du,0 such that |Du| ≤ k, σ(Du) ≥ Vu, and
∑
i∈Du Si ≤ Lu.
I now focus on solving the VMUC(Du,0, ~P , ~S, k, Vu, Lu) problem. First, I
prove the function σ(·) is non-negative, non-decreasing and submodular.
Theorem 1 (Monotonicity) The function σ : Du,0 → R∗ is monotonically non-
decreasing. i.e, σ(A) ≤ σ(A ∪ {v}), where A ⊆ Du,0 and v ∈ Du,0.
Proof. As discussed above, for a user u, each friend can be classified into vulnerable
or non-vulnerable friend. From Definition 5, the V-index of a user u decreases upon
21
removing the vulnerable friend v. Therefore, h(S∪A) ≤ h(S∪A∪{v}), where S and
A are sets of non-vulnerable (including user u) and vulnerable friends, respectively.
This means that for user u, the vulnerability of set A ∪ {v} is more than that of set
A. Hence, σ(A) ≤ σ(A ∪ {v}). 
Theorem 2 (Submodularity) If the function h(·) is submodular in terms of vul-
nerable friends, the function σ(·) is submodular, i.e., σ(A ∪ {v}) − σ(A) ≥ σ(B ∪
{v})− σ(B), where A ⊆ B ⊆ Du,0, and v ∈ Du,0.
Proof. If the function h(·) is submodular in terms of vulnerable friends, the marginal
gain in vulnerability of user u, by adding a vulnerable friend v to an initial vulnerable
set A, is at least as high as the marginal gain, by adding the same vulnerable node
v to an initial vulnerable superset B, i.e., h(S ∪ A ∪ {v}) − h(S ∪ A) ≥ h(S ∪ B ∪
{v}) − h(S ∪ B), where S is the set of non-vulnerable friends (which includes user
u), A and B are sets of vulnerable friends, and A ⊆ B. This means that the new
vulnerable friend v causes more increase when added to a set A than to a superset
B. Thus, σ(·) is submodular. 
Let us examine the assumption that the function h(·) is submodular in terms of
vulnerable friends. Assume that user v is user u’s vulnerable friend. If user u has 25
vulnerable friends as opposed to 50, where 25 vulnerable friends are a subset of 50,
then based on the assumption about the function h(·), user v is more vulnerable for
user u when u has fewer vulnerable friends than when u has more. In other words, the
vulnerability of user v can be mitigated due to the presence of more u’s vulnerable
friends.
Based on Theorems 1 and 2, the VMC problem is tantamount to the maximiza-
tion of non-negative, non-decreasing, submodular function with cardinality constraint.
A hill climbing algorithm can solve this problem with provable constant approxima-
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tion [57]. First start with an empty output set Du; add one element from an initial set
of vulnerable friends Du,0 to the output set that provides the largest marginal increase
in the function value; repeat the previous step until all the elements from an initial
set of vulnerable friends Du,0 are processed or the maximum cardinality bound k is
reached. According to [57], this greedy algorithm gives a (1 − 1/e)−approximation
for maximization of σ(·) function with a given cardinality constraint.
Similarly, with Theorems 1 and 2, the VMUC problem is equivalent to the max-
imization of non-negative, non-decreasing, submodular function with knapsack like
constraints. The greedy algorithm presented in [70] can be applied to solve the
VMUC problem with submodular objective function constrained by cardinality and
social utility. The proposed algorithm also gives (1− 1/e)-approximation guarantee.
The VMUC problem remains NP-hard [24] even when the objective function σ(·)
is linear, constrained by social utility and cardinality. It can be reduced to a single
dimensional knapsack problem. The following scaling and rounding algorithm is a
fully polynomial time approximation scheme [75] (FPTAS) for the VMUC problem
with a linear objective function with knapsack like constraints: for each vulnerable
user i ∈ Du,0, define new P-index P ′i = bPiK c, where K = ∗Pn , n = |Du,0|, P =∑
i∈Du,0 Pi and a given error parameter  > 0; with the new P-index, using a dynamic
programming algorithm similar to the single dimensional knapsack problem, find the
most vulnerable set Du ⊆ Du,0 and |Du| ≤ k.
For applying the scaling rounding algorithm, P-index values of all vulnerable
friends need to be integers. The P-index value of each user i ∈ Du,0 is a non negative
real number in the closed range 0 to 1. Since the proposed problem is a discrete opti-
mization problem, I can simply convert these P-index values into integers by shifting
the decimal points equally to the right. For experiments, on the VMUC problem
with linear objective, I multiply each P-index value by 1000 and then take the floor of
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the resulting value as new integer value for P-index. Errors caused due to the scaling
and rounding are negligible.
Solutions presented for VMC and VMUC problems, with corresponding assump-
tions, are summarized in the Table 2.3. The VMUC problem for non-linear social
utility gain constraints remains an open problem.
VMC VMUC Problem
Objective
Linear 1 FPTAS
function σ(·) Submodular (1− 1/e) (1− 1/e)
Table 2.3: Best Known Approximation Schemes and Bounds for the VMC and VMUC
Problems. The Objective Function σ(·) is Submodular Provided that the Function
h(·) is also Submodular in Terms of Vulnerable Friends.
2.4 Experiments
The proposed methods are demonstrated in practice through experiments using a
dataset derived from a real social networking site. The proposed experiments address
the challenge of vulnerability reduction with and without social utility constraints.
With an approach for identifying vulnerable friends, I set out to investigate the fol-
lowing issues:
• How effective are the measures in reducing vulnerability of users? What is an
effective way of reducing one’s vulnerability? How does it compare random
unfriending in reducing vulnerability of users?
• Do the indexes address the dynamics of social networks? I study the impact of
a new friend request and its effect on vulnerability of a user.
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• How effective are the unfriending algorithms in recommending at most k (≥ 0)
vulnerable friends to minimize user vulnerability while maintaining an accept-
able level2 of social utility loss?
• Does the user vulnerability reduction change significantly for different social
utility measures?
• At most, how many vulnerable friends should a user unfriend to achieve a
desired vulnerability reduction while maintaining an acceptable level of social
utility loss?
Next I discuss the dataset used for experiments, use the proposed index estima-
tion methods in an empirical study in an attempt to address these issues, report
preliminary results, and suggest new lines of research in finding vulnerable users.
2.4.1 Facebook Dataset
According to Quantcast3, over 145 million unique users in United States visit
Facebook within a month. This puts Facebook among top 3 websites based on the
number of people in the United States who visit each site within a month. Face-
book users spend over 700 billion minutes per month. The statistics suggest that
Facebook4 users provide a rich set of personal information through their profile, and
social activities. Thus, I use a Facebook dataset for evaluating the proposed work.
The Facebook dataset5 is created by crawling Facebook user profiles. Crawl-
ing is performed in breadth-first search manner starting from randomly selected
users(roots). The dataset contains publicly available profiles as well as network in-
2In this work, I set the acceptable level of social utility loss less than or equal to 10%
3http://www.quantcast.com/facebook.com, a media sharing and web analytics service company.
4http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22
5I use the same dataset as in [32]
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(a) Actual vs Crawled Friends (b) Actual vs Vulnerable Friends
(c) Crawled vs Vulnerable Friends
Figure 2.4: Facebook Dataset Fact
formation for more than two million users. I design two major tasks: vulnerability
reduction without social utility constraints, and vulnerability reduction with social
utility constraints. For the first task, I do not filter any Facebook user profiles from
the dataset. However, for the second task I remove the Facebook users who do not
share their friends’ information from the dataset, since unfriending is not possible on
such users. Table 2.4 shows the statistics of randomly selected 300K users from the
dataset used for the second task.
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Facebook dataset Count
Avg. actual friends per user 1056
Avg. crawled friends per user 154
Avg. vulnerable friends per user 98
Max. actual friends per user 5000
Min. actual friends per user 11
Max. crawled friends per user 4971
Min. crawled friends per user 11
Max. vulnerable friends per user 3222
Min. vulnerable friends per user 0
Table 2.4: Statistics for Randomly Selected 300K Facebook Users
For a given user, I may not obtain the information of all friends due to their
privacy settings. Friends for which I obtain the information are referred as crawled
friends. Figure 2.4 shows further facts about the randomly selected 300K users. X-
axis and Y-axis indicate users and their number of friends, respectively. For simplicity,
before plotting Figures 2.4a and 2.4b, I sort all users in the ascending order based
on the number of Facebook friends, while for Figure 2.4c, I sort all users in the
ascending order based on the number of crawled Facebook friends. Figure 2.4a shows
the relationship between actual Facebook friends (red) and crawled friends (blue) in
dataset. In experiments, I estimate the V-index of each user as an average of all
the P-index values of crawled friends. Based on the V-index, I compute the number
of vulnerable friends for each user, as described in Section 2.1. Figure 2.4b shows
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the relationship between actual Facebook friends (red) and their vulnerable friends
(blue). Figure 2.4c shows the relationship between crawled Facebook friends (red)
and their vulnerable friends (blue).
2.4.2 Vulnerability Reduction without Social Utility Constraints
I divide this major task into three experiments to test the (1) impact of differ-
ent unfriending strategies on users’ vulnerability, (2) performance of unfriending the
most vulnerable friend with different unfriending strategies, and (3) impact of new
friendship on secure users from vulnerable users.
Impact of different unfriending strategies
For the first set of experiments, I compare V-index for each of user with two optimal
algorithms and six intuitive strategies for unfriending to reduce vulnerability. For each
graph in Figure 2.5, the X-axis and Y-axis indicate users and their V-index values,
respectively. For simplicity, I sort all users in ascending order based on existing
V-index, and then I plot their corresponding V-index before and after unfriending.
Figure 2.5 indicates performance of all eight algorithms which will help us to decide
whether unfriending makes users more or less vulnerable. The eight algorithms are,
• Most vulnerable friend. For a user, the most vulnerable friend is the one whose
removal lowers the V-index score the most. For each user, I first find the
most vulnerable friend and then estimate the new V-index value (M1-index)
after unfriending him/her. As expected, see Figure 2.5a, V-index values for
users decrease in comparison with V-index values before unfriending the most
vulnerable friend. Unfriending the most vulnerable friend makes all users more
secure.
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(a) Most Vulnerable Friend (b) 2 Most Vulnerable Friends
(c) Least V-Friend (d) Random Friend
(e) Max P-Friend (f) 2 Max P-Friends
(g) Max V-Friend (h) 2 Max V-Friends
Figure 2.5: Performance Comparisons of V-Indexes for Each User Before (Red) and
After (Blue) Unfriending based on Eight Different Algorithms.
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• Two most vulnerable friends. If I sort all of user’s vulnerable friends in ascending
order based on their new V-indexes (after unfriending), the top two in the list are
the two most vulnerable friends. For each user, I first find two most vulnerable
friends and then estimate the new V-index value (M2-index) after unfriending
them. As expected, see Figure 2.5b, V-index values for all users decrease in
comparison with V-index values before unfriending the two most vulnerable
friends. Unfriending the two most vulnerable friends also make all users more
secure.
• Least V-friend. For each user, I choose to unfriend the friend whose V-index
is the lowest among all friends. This friend is the least V-friend. V-index
values increase for 65% of 100K users, and increase for 43% of the 2M+ users,
in comparison with V-index values before unfriending the least V-friend. See
Figure 2.5c, L-index refers to the new V-index value after unfriending the least
V-friend. V ′u > Vu for some users because, Pl < Vu where Pl is the P-index
of the least V-friend. Unfriending the least V-friend does not make all users
insecure.
• Random friend. For each user, I randomly choose to unfriend a friend. V-
index values increase for 24% of 100K users, and increase for 23.5% of the 2M+
users, in comparison with V-index values before unfriending a random friend.
See Figure 2.5d, R-index refers to the new V-index value after unfriending a
random friend. V ′u > Vu because Pr < Vu, where Pr is the P-index of the
random friend. Unfriending a random friend does not make all users secure.
• Max P-friend. For each user, I choose to unfriend a friend whose P-index is the
highest among all friends. V-index values increase for 5% of 100K users, and
increase for 11% of the 2M+ users, in comparison with V-index values before
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unfriending the max P-friend. See Figure 2.5e, MP1-index refers to the new V-
index value after unfriending the max P-friend. V ′u > Vu for some users because
Pmp1 < Vu, where Pmp1 is the P-index of the max P-friend. Unfriending the
max P-friend makes a majority of users more secure.
• Two max P-friend. For each user, I choose to unfriend two friends whose P-index
is the highest and second highest among all friends. V-index values increase for
5% of 100K users, and increase for 11% of the 2M+ users, in comparison with
V-index values before unfriending the two max P-friends.See Figure 2.5f, MP2-
index refers to the new V-index value after unfriending the two max P-friend.
V ′u > Vu for some users because (Pmp1 + Pmp2)/2 < Vu, where Pmp11 and Pmp2
are P-indexes of the two max P-friends. Unfriending the two max P-friends
makes a majority of users more secure.
• Max V-friend. For each user, I choose to unfriend a friend whose V-index is the
highest among all friends. V-index values increase for 3.6% of 100K users, and
increase for 5% of the 2M+ users, in comparison with V-index values before
unfriending max V-friend. See Figure 2.5g, MV1-index refers to the new V-
index value after unfriending the max V-friend. V ′u > Vu for some users because
Pmv1 < Vu, where Pmv1 is the P-index of the max V-friend. Unfriending the
max V-friend makes a majority of users more secure.
• Two max V-friend. For each user, I choose to unfriend two friends whose
V-index is the highest and second highest among all friends. V-index values
increase for 2.5% of 100K users, and increase for 5% of the 2M+ users, in com-
parison with V-index values before unfriending the two max V-friends. See
Figure 2.5h, GV2-index refers to the new V-index value after unfriending the
two max V-friends. V ′u > Vu for some users because (Pmv1 + Pmv2)/2 < Vu,
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where Pmv1 and Pmv2 are P-indexes of the two max V-friends. Unfriending the
two max V-friends make a majority of users more secure.
Performance comparison with the best unfriending strategy
In the second set of experiments, I compare the performance of unfriending most
vulnerable friends with the seven intuitive unfriending strategies. For each graph in
Figure 2.6, the X-axis and Y-axis indicate users and their associated V-index values
after unfriending, respectively. I sort all users in ascending order based on V-index
values after unfriending the most vulnerable friend and then plot corresponding V-
index based on different unfriending strategies. I find unfriending the most vulnerable
friend makes users more secure.
As expected, see Figure 2.6a-2.6d, V-index values for each user based on unfriend-
ing the least V-friend, a random friend, the max P-friend, or the max V-friend increase
for all users in comparison with their V-index values after unfriending the most vul-
nerable friend. In the case of unfriending the least V-friend, V-index values increase
for 3% of users in comparison with the most vulnerable friend unfriending. Similarly,
1.7% of users increase for a random friend unfriending, 1.7% of users increase for
the P-friend unfriend, and 1% of users increase for the V-friend unfriending. Thus,
unfriending the most vulnerable friend makes all users more secure than all other
schemes.
V-index values for each user based on unfriending the two most vulnerable friends,
see Figure 2.6e, do not decrease for 10% of 100K, and 21% of 2M+ users, in comparison
with V-index values after unfriending the most vulnerable friend. V-index values
for each user based on unfriending the two max P-friend, see Figure 2.6f, do not
decrease for 51% of 100K, and 81% of 2M+ users, in comparison with V-index values
after unfriending the most vulnerable friend. V-index values for each user based on
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unfriending the two max V-friend, see Figure 2.6g, do not decrease for 90% of 100K,
and 75% of 2M+ users, in comparison with V-index values after unfriending the most
vulnerable friend.
Impact of new friends
I now investigate the impact of new friendship on two types of secure users from
vulnerable users. I select three sets of 10K users from 2M+ Facebook users: (S1)
users with high V-indexes, (S2) users with low V-indexes, and (S3) C-attributes
enabled users with low V-indexes. I randomly select a vulnerable user (i.e., selected
from S1, 10K high V-index users) and a secure user (i.e., selected from S2, 10K low
V-index users), and pair them and remove the pair from S1 and S2, respectively,
until all 10K users from S1 and S2 are paired. I repeat the same with sets S1 and
S3. The two sets of results are shown in Figure 2.7 (a) and (b). For each graph, the
X- and Y-axis indicate users and their V-index values before and after the pairing
of new friends, respectively. I sort all users in ascending order based on their old
V-indexes. As shown in Figure 2.7a, V-indexes of all users of S2 increase significantly
and consistently; in Figure 2.7b, V-indexes of users of S3 also increase, but vary from
minor to large changes. The larger changes in the latter case occur on those users of
S3 with fewer friends. The results in Figure 2.7 confirm that less vulnerable users can
become more vulnerable if they are careless when making new friends, and reclusive
users are more sensitive to the choice of new friends than less reclusive ones.
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(a) Least V-friend (b) Random Friend
(c) Max P-Friend (d) Max V-Friend
(e) 2 Most Vulnerable Friends (f) 2 Max P-Friends
(g) 2 Max V-Friends
Figure 2.6: Performance Comparisons of Unfriending the Most Vulnerable Friend
(Red) with Seven Different Unfriending Ways (Blue).
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(a) C-Attributes are Not Visible (b) C-Attributes are Visible
Figure 2.7: Impact of New Friendship (Blue) on Users with Low V-Indexes (Red)
from Users with High V-Indexes
2.4.3 Vulnerability Reduction with Social Utility Constraints
To evaluate theoretical findings on vulnerability reduction with social utility con-
straints, I again design three experiments. First, in Figure 2.8, I compare the V-index
value of each user before and after the unfriending of k most vulnerable friends. I
refer this as the baseline. I do not consider social utility loss constraint when ob-
taining the baseline. Second, in Figure 2.9, I compare the V-index value of each user
before and after the unfriending of at most k vulnerable friends while maintaining
the acceptable level of social utility loss. I refer this approach as a social utility loss
based approach. Third, in Figure 2.10, I compare the reductions of the baseline and
social utility loss approach for each user. I observe from these experiments that it is
possible to suggest the maximum number of vulnerable friends to unfriend to achieve
desired user vulnerability reduction while maintaining an acceptable level of social
utility loss.
For each graph in Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10, X-axis and Y-axis indicate users
and their V-index values, respectively. Without loss of generality, I sort all users, in
the ascending order based on the existing V-index values, before I plot the graphs in
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(a) Most Vulnerable (b) 2 Most Vulnerable
(c) 10 Most Vulnerable (d) 50 Most Vulnerable
Figure 2.8: (The Baseline) Performance Comparison of V-Index Values for Each User
Before (Red) and After (Blue) Unfriending the k Most Vulnerable Friends from His
Social Network.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9. For Figure 2.10, I sort all users in the ascending order based on
the V-index values computed using the baseline approach.
The baseline
It consists of results from solving the VMC problem with linear objective function
σ(·). As shown in Section 2.1, such a problem can be solved in polynomial time. k
(or |Du,0|, if |Du,0| < k) most vulnerable friends are selected for removal to minimize
the objective function. I run this experiment on randomly selected 300K users of the
Facebook dataset. Figure 2.8 shows the performance comparison of V-index values
for each user before (red) and after (blue) unfriending at most k vulnerable friends. I
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(a) Unfriend 1 (b) Unfriend 2
(c) Unfriend 10 (d) Unfriend 50
Figure 2.9: Performance Comparisons of V-Index Values for Each User Before (Red)
and After (Blue) Unfriending at Most k Vulnerable Friends with the Total Degree of
Vulnerable Users as a Social Utility Constraint. I Set an Error Parameter  = 0.1
(Input Parameter to FPTAS) and Retain At Least 90% of the Total Degrees of All
the Vulnerable Friends After Unfriending.
run the experiments for different values of k including 1, 2, 10, and 50. As expected,
vulnerability decreases consistently as the value of k increases as seen in Figures 2.8a-
2.8d. For a given k, the baseline is expected to achieve maximum user vulnerability
reduction, but cannot guarantee the retention of socially valuable vulnerable friends.
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A social utility based approach
I compute the minimized user vulnerability by solving the VMUC problem. For
experiments, the V-index for each user is estimated as an average of all the P-index
values of crawled friends. Hence, the objective function σ(·) for VMUC is linear.
As discussed in Section 2.3, the scaling and rounding algorithm presented is FPTAS
for such a relaxed VMUC problem. Figure 2.9 shows the performance comparisons
of minimized V-index values for each user before (red) and after (blue) unfriending
at most k vulnerable friends with the sum of all their degrees as a social utility
constraint. Due to the theoretical guarantees of FPTAS, I set error parameter  to
relatively low value and aim to retain as high number of valuable friends as possible.
I set error parameter  = 0.1 (input parameter to FPTAS) and retain at least 90%
of the total degrees of all the vulnerable friends after unfriending. As FPTAS runs
slower for a smaller error parameter, I run the experiments for randomly selected 10K
users out of 300K users. As expected, vulnerability drops consistently as the value of
k increases. I show the experiment results for four different k values including 1, 2,
10, and 50 in Figures 2.9a- 2.9d. I also run the experiments with other forms of social
utility measures such as tie strength and number of common friends. Tie strength
between two friends follows a random distribution by having a value between 0 to
1 for each user, where 1 represents the maximum social tie strength. I observe the
similar patterns in user vulnerability reduction for these two social utility measures.
Comparing the social utility approach with the baseline
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate how effective the social utility approach
is in reducing vulnerability and retaining social utility. Figure 2.10 shows the per-
formance comparison. The results for four different k values (1, 2, 10, and 50) are
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(a) Unfriend 1 (b) Unfriend 2
(c) Unfriend 10 (d) Unfriend 50
Figure 2.10: Performance Comparison Between the Baseline and the Social Utility
Approach.
depicted in Figures 2.10a- 2.10d. I use the total number of degrees of vulnerable
friends as a social utility measure. As expected, vulnerability reduction for the base-
line is more than the social utility approach. However, we can still achieve significant
reduction with the social utility constraint. I observe similar results for the other two
social utility measures, i.e., tie strength and number of common friends.
Before unfriending any vulnerable friend, the average V-index value of all users is
0.3485. Table 2.5 shows the average V-index values for the baseline and social utility
approach. The results for the three different social utility measures are presented.
It also reports the percentage decrease in average V-index value for each approach.
The marginal reduction in the average V-index decreases as the value of k increases.
Results show that baseline is always the most effective in removing the vulnerable
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Approach Unfriending k Friends
k = 1 k = 2 k = 5 k = 10 k = 50
Baseline
0.3425
(↓ 1.71%)
0.3371
(↓ 3.26%)
0.3216
(↓ 7.74%)
0.2944
(↓ 15.52%)
0.1891
(↓ 45.73%)
Degree
0.3427
(↓ 1.67%)
0.3381
(↓ 2.98%)
0.3261
(↓ 6.45%)
0.3048
(↓ 12.54%)
0.2185
(↓ 37.31%)
Priority
0.3426
(↓ 1.68%)
0.3378
(↓ 3.07%)
0.3250
(↓ 6.77%)
0.3025
(↓ 13.20%)
0.2146
(↓ 38.43%)
Common Friends
0.3426
(↓ 1.68%)
0.3378
(↓ 3.08%)
0.3249
(↓ 6.8%)
0.3027
(↓ 13.13%)
0.2151
(↓ 38.28%)
Table 2.5: The Average V-index Values for the Baseline and Three Different Social
Utility Measures. Numbers in Brackets are Percentage Decreases in Each Average
V-index Value. The Average V-index Value of All Users Before Unfriending Any
Vulnerable Friend is 0.3485.
friends. This is because it removes the most vulnerable friends without considering
the social utility loss for a given k. But this may incur the cost of loss in social utility
value for a user. The social utility approach aims to retain the 90% of user u’s social
utility value for a given k in when minimizing u’s vulnerability. Table 2.5 provides a
summary of comparative results for k = 1, 2, 5, 10, 50. I observe the following: (1) the
more vulnerable friends to remove, the less vulnerable a user is for all four cases (the
baseline plus 3 social utility measures); (2) by allowing for a 10% loss of a social utility
measure, one can still achieve comparable reduction to the baseline; (3) vulnerability
reduction by all three social utility measures are similar; (4) for a given k, the baseline
40
achieves the largest reduction; and (5) but the gain over a social utility measure can
be easily eliminated by removing the next larger k friends. For example, unfriending
2 vulnerable friends with any social utility measure can attain vulnerability reduction
that is larger than that of the baseline with k = 1.
2.5 Summary
There are vulnerable friends on social networking sites and it is important to find
and unfriend vulnerable friends so that users can improve their privacy and security.
However, unfriending vulnerable friends from a user’s social network can significantly
decrease the user’s social utility. In this chapter, I studied the novel problem of vul-
nerability reduction with and without social utility loss constraints. First, I provided
general model for vulnerability reduction. Using this model, I formulated the two
discrete optimization problems, viz., VMC and VMUC. The VMC problem only
considers the cardinality constraint while the VMUC problem considers cardinality
as well as social utility constraints. Both problems are NP-hard. Proposed exper-
iments on the Facebook dataset evaluate the effectiveness of different methods of
vulnerability reduction with and without social utility constraints.
I proposed a feasible approach to a novel problem of identifying a user’s vulnerable
friends on a social networking site. This work differs from existing work addressing
social networking privacy by introducing a vulnerability-centered approach to a user
security on a social networking site. On most social networking sites, privacy related
efforts have been concentrated on protecting individual attributes only. However,
users are often vulnerable through community attributes. Unfriending vulnerable
friends can help protect users against the security risks. Based on this study of over
2 million users, I find that users are either not careful or not aware of security and
privacy concerns of their friends. The proposed model clearly highlights the impact
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of each new friend on a user’s privacy. The proposed approach does not require
the structural change of a social networking site and aims to maximally reduce a
user’s vulnerability while minimizing his social utility loss. The work formulates a
novel problem of constrained vulnerability reduction suggests a feasible approach, and
demonstrates that the problem of constrained vulnerability reduction is solvable.
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Chapter 3
IDENTIFYING VULNERABILITY OF ACTIVE USERS WITH PRIVATE
SETTINGS
In this chapter, my focus is on active users which mark majority of their profile
settings private (i.e., Q2 users). For the rest of this chapter, they are simply referred
as users, unless otherwise stated. Social media wants their users to be more social
at the same time less concerned about unwarranted access to their personal data.
Recent social media advancements are creating new opportunities for meaningful in-
teractions among users, while enabling new profile settings for users to better protect
their personal information. New mechanisms such as Facebook page allow users’ to
interact through posts without requiring them to be friends, while keeping their per-
sonal information, including demographic profiles, lists of friends, and interactions
with friends private. Users’ interactions on these pages are often centrally adminis-
tered and publicly available for everyone. Based on whether a user can control the
visibility of her actions, a post can be categorized into two parts: personal or public
post. A personal post is a post which can be controlled by a user’s individual profile
settings, otherwise it is referred as a public post. In this chapter, I exclusively focus
on public posts, and the users’ actions, including liking, commenting and sharing,
on public posts are together referred as their public interactions while the interac-
tions on personal posts are personal interactions. Given the pervasive availability of
public interactions, I ask – are users’ personal attributes predictable using only the
interactions on public posts?
To answer the question, I study the problem of the predictability of users’ personal
attributes in the context of Facebook pages. There are several challenges regarding
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the data in Facebook pages. The first challenge is about the unavailability of users’
connections. Based on the literature, users’ connections play a vital role in predicting
personal attributes. However, users’ connections can be marked invisible using profile
settings. Also, Facebook pages do not require users to form any kind of connection
to interact with each other. The second challenge is about the text complexity. Dur-
ing the recent events across the globe including “Arab Spring”, “Assam riots”, and
“Bangladesh Protests”, Facebook users primarily communicated in their local lan-
guages such as Arabic, Assamese, and Bengali rather than English, which makes text
data complex to analyze. Although interactions are pervasively available, however,
public posts are visible to the public and all users can perform actions on them. This
property of public posts results in the public interaction data extremely sparse and
further exacerbates the difficulty of the prediction problem.
3.1 Problem Formulation
I first present the notations used in this chapter. Let A ∈ Rn×m be the matrix,
where n is the number of rows and m is the number of columns. The entry at i-th
row and j-th column of A is denoted as A(i, j). A(i, :) and A(:, j) denote the i-th
row and j-th column of A, respectively. ‖A‖F is the Frobenius norm of A, and
‖A‖F =
√∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1 A(i, j)
2.
Typically, two types of objects are involved in public interactions, i.e., users and
public posts in Facebook pages. Let u = {u1, u2, . . . , un} be the set of users, and
v = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} be the set of public posts, where n and m are the total numbers
of users and public posts, respectively. Depending on the social media site, users’
interactions involve different types of actions. For example, Facebook users mainly
perform three types of actions on public posts and their associated items including
liking, commenting, and sharing. For each publicly known action, I can construct the
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user-post action matrix R ∈ Rn×m, where Rij = 1 if i-th user’s perform the action
to j-th post, otherwise 0. For the simplicity of discussion, I assume that R contains
user-post like actions.
Users can control their personal data such as demographic profiles and personal
posts including status updates, photos and videos via their profile settings to avoid
unwarranted access. However, users’ interactions in Facebook pages are beyond their
control and are always available to the public. Therefore in this chapter, I ask - are
users’ personal attributes predictable using public interactions in Facebook pages? To
answer this question, I design a task of predicting users’ personal attributes with
public interaction data.
The problem of predicting users’ attributes is extensively studied. It assumes that
there are N users in u labeled with N < n. I assume that uL = {u1, u2, . . . , uN} is a
set of labeled users where uL is a subset of u. Let YL ∈ RN×K be the label matrix
of uL where K is the total number values of a given attribute. The vast majority
of existing attribute prediction algorithms make use of users’ personal data such as
their personal posts [62, 13] or their social networks [39, 53, 74] to obtain a predictor
f to predict the attribute of users in {u \ uL}. To seek an answer to the question of
whether users’ personal attributes are predictable using only public interaction data,
I investigate the predictability of user’s attribute with users’ interactions to public
posts, which is formally stated as - Given users’ public interactions on posts, the
known attribute labels YL, I aim to learn a predictor f to automatically predict the
attribute for unlabeled users i.e, {u \ uL}.
3.2 Framework for Attribute Prediction: SCOUT
A user usually performs like actions with a small proportions of personal posts,
resulting in a sparse user-post action relationships. One of the key difference between
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public and personal posts is that only friends can perform interactions on personal
posts, whereas all users can perform interactions on public posts. Hence, interaction
patterns on public posts are likely to be more sparse than personal posts. Thus, the
problem of predicting the personal attributes from such sparse public interactions is
more challenging for traditional classification methods including support vector ma-
chines (SVM), logistic regression, and naive bayes. The proposed framework, SCOUT,
aims to address the sparse interactions problem by learning a compact representation
of users with the help of social theories. This compact representation is later used to
build a predictor f to automatically predict the personal attributes.
3.2.1 Learning a Compact Representation
The low-rank matrix factorization-based method is one of the popular way to
obtain the compact representation of users [71]. In this chapter, I adopt the well
known matrix factorization model [18] to obtain low rank representation of users. The
matrix factorization model seeks a low rank representation U ∈ Rn×d with d << n
via solving following optimization problem.
min
U,H,V
‖R−UHV>‖2F , (3.1)
where V ∈ Rm×d is a low-rank space representation of the set of public posts; and
H ∈ Rd×d captures the correlations between the low rank representations of users
and public posts such as R(i, j) = U(i, :)HV>(j, :). To avoid over-fitting, I add
smoothness regularization on U, H, and V into Eq. (3.1), and then I have,
min
U,H,V
‖(R−UHV>)‖2F + λ(‖U‖2F + ‖V‖2F + ‖H‖2F ), (3.2)
where λ is non-negative and are introduced to control the capability of U, V and
H. The learnt compact representation may be inaccurate because of the sparsity of
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W. The number of zero entities in R is much larger than that of non-zero numbers,
which indicates that U(i, :)HV>(j, :) will fit to be zero. The extreme sparsity of R
will result in the learnt representation U close to a zero matrix.
One way to mitigate the data sparsity challenge is to give different weights to
the observed and missing actions. In detail, I introduce a weight matrix W ∈ Rn×m
where Wij is the weight to indicate the importance of Rij in the factorization process.
The new formulation is presented in Eq. (3.2) as
min
U,H,V
‖W  (R−UHV>)‖2F + λ(‖U‖2F + ‖V‖2F + ‖H‖2F ), (3.3)
where  is the Hadamard product and (A  B)(i, j) = A(i, j) × B(i, j) for any
two matrices A and B with the same size. W(i, j) = 1 if R(i, j) = 1. Following the
suggestions in [72], I set W(i, j) to a small value close to zero when R(i, j) = 0, which
allows negative samples in the learning process. In this work, I set W(i, j) = 0.01
when R(i, j) = 0.
In addition to like actions, users can perform other actions such as sharing and
commenting. There are many social theories such as homophily [52] and consis-
tency [1] theories developed to explain users’ actions. These social theories pave a
way for us to model user-user and post-post correlations, which can potentially further
mitigate the data sparse problem.
3.2.2 Modeling Correlations
User-user and post-post correlations in social media are widely used to improve
various tasks such as feature selection [73], sentiment analysis [38, 45] and recom-
mendation [49]. Next, I propose a novel way to compute the user-user and post-post
correlations to tackle the sparsity problem further using users’ actions on public posts
and their associated items such as comments and shared posts.
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Modeling User-User Correlations
Apart from likes, users also perform other actions including commenting, replying
and sharing on different types of objects such as posts, shared posts, and comments.
This subsection provides a way to include these users’ activities by modeling user-
user correlations. Homophily [52] is one of the important social theories developed to
explain users’ actions during interactions in the real world. Homophily theory suggests
that similar users are likely to perform similar actions. These intuitions motivate us to
obtain low-rank space representation of users based on their historical actions during
interactions. I define Ψ(i, j) to measure the user-user correlation coefficients between
ui and uj. There are many ways to measure user-user correlation, such as similarity of
users’ behavior [50] and connections in social networks [49]. In this chapter, I choose
the similarity of users’ historical behavior to measure user-user correlations. A user
can perform a variety of actions, including liking, commenting, and sharing. Hence,
similarity is calculated as a function of the total amount of actions performed by two
users together:
Ψ(i, j) = h(l(i, j), c(i, j), s(i, j)), (3.4)
where l(i, j), c(i, j) and s(i, j) record the number of likes, comments and shares,
respectively, performed by ui and uj together. h(·) combines these users’ behaviors
together, which is defined as a sign function in this chapter:
Ψ(i, j) =

1 if l(i, j) + c(i, j) + s(i, j) > 0,
0 Otherwise.
(3.5)
With Ψ(i, j), I model user-user correlations by minimizing the following term as
min
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ψ(i, j)‖U(i, :)−U(j, :)‖22 (3.6)
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Users close to each other in the low-rank space are more likely to be similar and
their distances in the latent space are controlled by their correlation coefficients. For
example, Ψ(i, j) controls the latent distance between ui and uj. A larger value of
Ψ(i, j) indicates that ui and uj are more likely to be similar. Thus, I force their
latent representation should be as close as possible, while a smaller value of Ψ(i, j)
tells that the distance of their latent representation should be larger.
For a particular user ui, the terms in Eq. (3.6) related to her latent representation
Ui are,
min
n∑
j=1
Ψ(i, j)‖U(i, :)−U(j, :)‖22 (3.7)
I can see that the latent representation of ui is smoothed with other users, controlled
by Ψ(i, j), hence even for long tail users, with a few or even without any actions,
I can still get an approximate estimate of their latent representation via user-user
correlations, addressing the sparsity problem in Eq. (3.3).
After some derivations, I can get the matrix form of Eq. (3.6) as
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ψ(i, j)‖U(i, :)−U(j, :)‖22
=
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
Ψ(i, j)
(
U(i, k)−U(j, k))2
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
Ψ(i, j)U2(i, k)−
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
Ψ(i, j)U(i, k)U(j, k)
=
d∑
k=1
U>(:, k)(Du − S)U(:, k)
= Tr(U>LuU), (3.8)
where Lu = Du − S is the Laplacian matrix and Du is a diagonal matrix with the
i-th diagonal element Du(i, i) =
∑n
j=1 Ψ(j, i). S is the user-user correlation matrix
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defined as
S =

Ψ(1, 1) Ψ(1, 2) · · · Ψ(1, n)
Ψ(2, 1) Ψ(2, 2) · · · Ψ(2, n)
...
...
. . .
...
Ψ(n, 1) Ψ(n, 2) · · · Ψ(n, n)

Modeling Post-Post Correlations
Apart from likes, posts also receive other actions including commenting and sharing
from users. This subsection provides a way to include these activities on posts. Con-
sistency [1] is one of the important social theories developed to explain users’ actions,
which suggests that users’ actions on similar posts are likely to remain consistent.
These intuitions motivate us to obtain low-rank space representation of posts based
on historical actions received by them. I define Φ(i, j) to measure the post-post cor-
relation between vi and vj. In this chapter, I choose the similarity of actions received
by posts to measure post-post correlations. A post can receive a variety of actions, in-
cluding liking, commenting, and sharing. Hence, similarity is calculated as a function
of the total amount of actions received by two posts together:
Φ(i, j) = g(l(i, j), c(i, j), s(i, j)), (3.9)
where l(i, j), c(i, j) and s(i, j) record the number of users who perform likes, comments
and shares, respectively, on pi and pj together. g(·) combines these users’ behaviors
together, which is defined as a sign function in this chapter:
Φ(i, j) =

1 if l(i, j) + c(i, j) + s(i, j) > 0,
0 Otherwise.
(3.10)
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With Φ(i, j), I model post-post correlations by minimizing the following term as
min
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Φ(i, j)‖V(i, :)−V(j, :)‖22 (3.11)
Posts close to each other in the low-rank space are more likely to be similar and
their distances in the latent space are controlled by their correlation coefficients. For
example, Φ(i, j) controls the latent distance between vi and vj. A larger value of
Φ(i, j) indicates that vi and vj are more likely to be similar. Thus, I force their latent
representations should be as close as possible, while a smaller value of Φ(i, j) tells
that the distance of their latent representation should be larger.
For a particular post vi, the terms in Eq. (3.6) related to its latent representation
Vi are,
min
m∑
j=1
Φ(i, j)‖V(i, :)−V(j, :)‖22 (3.12)
I can see that the latent representation of vi is smoothed with other posts, controlled
by Φ(i, j), hence even for long tail posts, with a few or even without any actions,
I can still get an approximate estimate of their latent representation via post-post
correlations, addressing the sparsity problem in Eq. (3.3).
By following the derivations in Eq. (3.8), I can get the matrix form of Eq. (3.11)
as
1
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Φ(i, j)‖V(i, :)−V(j, :)‖22 = Tr(V>LvV), (3.13)
where Lv = Dv − P is the Laplacian matrix and Dv is a diagonal matrix with the
i-th diagonal element Dv(i, i) =
∑m
j=1 Φ(j, i). P is the post-post correlation matrix
defined as
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P =

Φ(1, 1) Φ(1, 2) · · · Φ(1, n)
Φ(2, 1) Φ(2, 2) · · · Φ(2, n)
...
...
. . .
...
Φ(n, 1) Φ(n, 2) · · · Φ(n, n)

3.2.3 The Proposed Algorithm to Learn Compact Representation
With the components of modeling user-user and post-post correlations, the pro-
posed algorithm is to solve the following optimization problem first.
min
U,H,V
‖W  (R−UHV>)‖2F + λ(‖U‖2F + ‖V‖2F + ‖H‖2F )
+αTr(U>LuU) + βTr(V>LvV), (3.14)
where the first term is used to exploit the available users’ like actions on posts, second
term captures user-user correlations, and post-post correlations are captured by third
term. The parameter α and β is introduced to control the contribution from user-user
and post-post correlations, respectively.
The optimization problem in Eq. (3.14) is a multi-objective with respect to the
three variables U, H, and V together. A local minimum of the objective function J
in Eq. (3.14) can be obtained through an alternative scheme.
Computation of H. Optimizing the objective function in Eq. (3.14) with respect
to H is equivalent to solving
min
H
JH = ‖W  (R−UHV>)‖2F + λ‖H‖2F (3.15)
The derivative of JH with respect to H is
dJH
dH
= −2U>(W W R)V + 2U>(W W UHV>)V + 2λH (3.16)
52
Hence, the minimum can be achieved by substituting[
dJH
dH
]
(i, j) = 0. Thus, I obtain
[−U>(W W R)V + U>(W W UHV>)V + λH](i, j) = 0 (3.17)
Similar to [18], it leads to the updating rule of H,
H(i, j)← H(i, j)
√
[U>(W W R)V] (i, j)
[U>(W W UHV>)V + λH] (i, j) (3.18)
Computation of U. Similar to the computation of H, optimizing the objective
function in Eq. (3.14) with respect to U leads to the updating rule of U,
U(i, j)← U(i, j)
√
[(W W R)VH> + αSU] (i, j)
[(W W UHV>)VH> + αDuU + λU] (i, j) (3.19)
Computation of V. Similarly, optimizing the objective function in Eq. (3.14) with
respect to V leads to the updating rule of V,
V(i, j)← V(i, j)
√
[(W W R)>UH + βPV] (i, j)
[(W W UHV>)>UH + βDvV + λV] (i, j) (3.20)
It can be proven that updating rules in Eq. (3.18), Eq. (3.19) and Eq. (3.20) are
guaranteed to converge. Since the proof process is similar to that in [66, 18], to save
space, I omit the detailed proof of the convergence of the updating rules in Eq. (3.18),
Eq. (3.19) and Eq. (3.20).
In summary, I present the computational algorithm for optimizing Eq. (3.14) in
Algorithm 1. In the algorithm, I conduct initialization of two Laplacian matrices,
and random initialization of three matrices to be inferred from lines 1 and 2. T
is the number of maximum iterations. The three matrices are updated with the
updating rules until convergence or reaching the number of maximum iterations.
The correctness and convergence of the updating rule can be proved with standard
auxiliary function approach [66, 18].
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Algorithm 1 The Proposed Algorithm to Learn Compact Representation
Input: R, S, P, d, λ, α, β, T
Output: U, V
1: Construct matrices Lu and Lv in Eq. 3.8 and 3.13
2: Initialize matrices U, V and H randomly
3: while Not convergent and t ≤ T do
4: Update H(i, j)← H(i, j)
√
[U>(WWR)V](i,j)
[U>(WWUHV>)V+λH](i,j)
5: Update U(i, j)← U(i, j)
√
[(WWR)VH>+αSU](i,j)
[(WWUHV>)VH>+αDuU+λU](i,j)
6: Update V(i, j)← V(i, j)
√
[(WWR)>UH+βPV](i,j)
[(WWUHV>)>UH+βDvV+λV](i,j)
7: t = t+ 1
8: end while
Algorithm 2 The Proposed Framework SCOUT.
Input: R, S, P λ, α, β, T , and YL
Output: A SVM Classifier f
1: Learn the compact representation U for u by Algorithm 1;
2: Obtain the compact representation UL for the labeled users uL;
3: Train a SVM classifier f with UL and YL;
3.2.4 Building A Classifier for Attribute Prediction
After obtaining the low-rank representation of U by Algorithm 1, I choose the
well-known linear SVM as the basic classifier for the attribute prediction task. The
detailed framework SCOUT is presented in
Next I briefly review the above algorithm. In line 1, I learn the compact rep-
resentation by Algorithm 1, and in line 3, I training a SVM classifier based on the
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representation of the labeled users UL and their labels YL. Note that the proposed
framework uses SVM as the basic classifier which only takes discrete values as labels
such as gender, sexual orientation, relationship status, and religious affiliations etc.
For a continuous valued attribute such as age, I simply perform discretization for
SVM. Actually I can choose regression models as basic models to deal with continued
value attributes and I would like to leave it as the future work.
3.3 Experiments
In this section, I conduct experiments to answer the following two questions - (1)
can the proposed framework predict users’ attributes from public interaction data?
and (2) is it necessary to learn a compact representation? After the introduction of
experimental settings, I design experiments to answer above two questions and finally
perform analysis for the important parameters of the proposed framework.
3.3.1 Facebook Datasets
For experiments, I collect a Facebook dataset consisting of users’ interactions
on the “Basher Kella” Page1 during the recent events of the Bangladesh protests2.
The “Basher Kella” Facebook page represents the influential political organization in
Bangladesh which also has the records of supporting violence3. This Facebook page4
was founded on March 7, 2013. From March 7, 2013 till April 21, 2013, I collect
Facebook users’ actions on all the posts published on this page. The majority of
1https://www.facebook.com/newbasherkella
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Shahbag_protests
3http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/net-instigation-in-full-force/
4Old version of the Basher Kella Facebook page was banned during the recent events of the
Bangladesh protests due to its violent content. On March 7, a new page was created which can be
accessed using https://www.facebook.com/newbasherkella
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these posts, comments and replies are written in Bengali language.
Table 3.1: Statistics of the Facebook Dataset
# of days crawl 47
# of users 498,674
# of public posts 9,907
Avg # of Likes per user 15.87
Avg # of Likes per post 580.10
Avg # of Comments per user 1.20
Avg # of Comments per post 44.11
Avg # of Shares per user 2.79
Avg # of Shares per post 139.89
Originally I collect 42,599 public posts and the administrators of this page con-
tribute 23.25% (9907) of the total number of posts (admin-posts). As I expected,
users’ actions on the admin-posts were significantly higher than the posts from other
Facebook users. Majority of the posts from other users contains no actions. Therefore
I only use public posts from the administrators of the page in this study. For each
post, I collect all the users who likes, comments and shares it. For each comment on
a post, I collect all the users who like, and reply it. For each reply, I collect all the
users who likes it. For each share, I collect all the users who like and comment on
it. Finally, for each comment on a share, I also collect users who like, and reply it.
Also, for each reply on a share comment, I collect all the users who likes it. Table 3.1
shows the overall statistics of the dataset.
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In this work, I choose three attributes, i.e., religious affiliation, relationship status
and sexual orientation. For the religious affiliation attribute, to establish the ground
truth for evaluation, I first use the Facebook graph search results to examine the set
of users who set the attribute available to the public and then collect the attributes of
these users with their public interaction data to establish a dataset, Facebook-religion,
to assess the performance of the proposed framework. The statistics of Facebook-
religion is shown in Table 3.1a. I only find a small portion of users (2853 out of
42,599) who set their religious affiliation publicly available, which is consistent with
the observation in [32]. I obtain 5 values for religious affiliation, i.e., Muslim, Atheist,
Buddhist, Hindu, or Christian and these five religions are indeed the top five religions
in Bangladesh based on their populations5. To assess the performance of the proposed
framework with other attributes, I also choose another two attributes, relationship
status and sexual orientation. For each of these two attributes, following a similar
process, I build a dataset based on 2853 users. The statistics of Facebook-relation
and Facebook-sexual are shown in 3.1b and 3.1c, respectively. For relationship status,
I consider two values, single and not-single. All the Facebook users with relation
status values as “married”, “engaged” and “in a relationship” are considered not-
single, whereas “single”, “widowed”, and “divorced” are considered single. Sexual
orientation attributes are interpreted using “Interested In” values from Facebook
users’ profiles. I consider three values for sexual orientation such as users who like
men, users who like women, and users who like both men and women.
For each dataset, I choose x% of the dataset for training and the remaining (1−x)%
as testing. In this work, I vary x as {50, 60, 70, 80, 90}. For each x, I repeat the
experiments 5 times and report the average performance.
From the evaluation perspective, precision and recall are equally important for
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh
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Religion # of Users Percentages(%)
Muslim 1866 65.40
Atheist 216 7.57
Buddhist 113 3.96
Hindu 463 16.23
Christian 195 6.84
Total 2853 100
(a) Statistics of Facbook-Religion Dataset
Values # of Users Percentages(%)
Single 760 65.01
Not-single 409 34.99
Total 1169 100
(b) Statistics for the Facebook-Relation Dataset
Values # of Users Percentages(%)
Men 196 9.65
Women 507 24.96
Men & Women 1328 65.39
Total 2031 100
(c) The Statistics for Facebook-Interested-In Dataset
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the prediction task. For example, in an Islamic country like Bangladesh, the cost of
incorrectly predicting someone as atheist could be disastrous, as it carries connota-
tions of blasphemy6. However, precision, recall, and F1-score are biased towards one
of the labels. Hence, it is unsuitable for the unbalanced evaluation dataset. For this
purpose, I use commonly adopted macro-average F1 score to assess the prediction
performance, as it gives equal weight to all the labels. The macro-average F1 score
is defined as,
macro− F1 =
∑K
i=1 Fi
K
, where Fi =
2piri
pi + ri
, (3.21)
where pi and ri refer to the precision and recall values associated with the i-th label,
respectively. Note that F -score can not be computed for a baseline which always
picks the majority label for the prediction.
3.3.2 Performance Evaluation
In this subsection, I conduct experiments to answer the first question - can the
proposed framework predict users’ personal attributes from users’ public interaction
data? To answer this question, I investigate the performance of the proposed frame-
work by comparing it with the random performance. For SCOUT, I choose the cross-
validation to determine the parameter values and more details about the parameter
analysis will be discussed in the following subsection. I empirically set the number of
latent dimensions d to 50. The performance results for Facebook-religion, Facebook-
relation and Facebook-sexual are demonstrated in Figures 3.1a, 3.1b and 3.1c, respec-
tively.
I have the following observations:
• For all the Figures 3.1a, 3.1b and 3.1c, the performance of SCOUT increases
6http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atheism_and_religion#Atheism_in_Islam
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with the increase of x. This is due to the fact that more training data helps to
build a better SVM classifier.
• The proposed framework consistently outperforms the random method. The
proposed algorithm gains up to 70.49% and 49.83% relative improvement in
Facebook-religion and Facebook-sexual, respectively. I conduct a t-test on these
results and the evidence from t-test suggests that the improvement is signifi-
cant. These results support that users’ personal attributes are predictable from
public interaction data. In the following subsections, I will investigate the con-
tributions from different components to this improvement.
In conclusion, above results suggest a positive answer to the first questions -
the proposed framework can predict various users’ personal attributes from public
interaction data.
3.3.3 Impact of the Learnt Compact Representation
As mentioned above, the public interaction data representation matrix R is very
sparse and I proposed an algorithm to learn a compact representation U with the help
of social theories. In this subsection, I study the impact of the compact representation
on the performance of the proposed framework to answer the second question. In
detail, I define the following variants:
• SCOUT-Corr: Eliminate the impact of the user-user and post-post correlations
by setting α = β = 0 in Eq. (3.14);
• SCOUT-Corr-W: Eliminate the effects from both the correlation and the weight
matrix W by setting α = β = 0 and W to be a matrix with all entities equal
to 1 in Eq. (3.14); and
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50 60 70 80 90 
Random 0.1619 0.1599 0.1481 0.1508 0.158 
SCOUT 0.2418 0.2454 0.2523 0.2571 0.2635 
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(a) Religious Affiliation
50 60 70 80 90 
Random 0.4861 0.4865 0.4763 0.498 0.501 
SCOUT 0.5377 0.5397 0.5584 0.5811 0.6236 
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(b) Relationship Status
50 60 70 80 90 
Random 0.279 0.2885 0.301 0.2998 0.2998 
SCOUT 0.4 0.409 0.4199 0.4321 0.4492 
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(c) Interested In
Figure 3.1: Prediction Performance of the Proposed Framework
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• SCOUT-R: Eliminate the impact of the compact representation by learning the
SVM classifier with the original matrix R.
I only show results on Facebook-relation in Figure 3.2 since I have similar ob-
servations with other settings. Note that sometimes the classifier gives the majority
prediction and I can not compute macro-F1 in this situation; hence I use “N.A.” to de-
note the performance in the table. When eliminating the impact of the user-user and
post-post correlations, the performance of SCOUT-Corr reduces, which indicates the
importance of incorporating these correlations based on social theories. When elimi-
nating these correlations and the weight matrix W, a traditional matrix factorization
algorithm learns the compact representation and the performance of SCOUT-Corr-W
reduces dramatically. As mentioned before, the extreme sparsity of R will lead to the
learned compact representation close to zero. When building the classifier based on
the sparse matrix R, the performance of SCOUT-R also reduces a lot. I can not learn
a good classifier based on the sparse and high-dimensional matrix R, which directly
supports the importance of learning a compact representation for uesrs.
In conclusion, the learned compact representation can mitigate the sparse problem
of public interaction data and plays an important role in the performance improve-
ment of the proposed framework, which correspondingly answers the section question.
3.3.4 Impact of User-User and Post-Post Correlations
The parameters α and β are introduced to control the contributions from user-
user and post-post correlations for the proposed framework SCOUT. Therefore, I
investigate the impact of user-user and post-post correlations via analyzing how the
changes in α and β affect the performance of SCOUT in terms of the attribute
prediction. I vary the value of α and β as {0, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000}. The results
are shown in Figure 3.3 for Facebook-religion. I ignore the results with other settings
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50 60 70 80 90 
SCOUT 0.5377 0.5397 0.5584 0.5811 0.6236 
SCOUT-Corr 0.4919 0.4934 0.4973 0.5109 0.5286 
SCOUT-Corr-W 0.2608 0.268       
SCOUT-R 0.4241 0.4393 0.4578 0.4684 0.4676 
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N.A. N.A. N.A.
Figure 3.2: Impact of the Learnt Compact Representation on the Proposed Frame-
work. Note that Sometimes the Classifier Gives the Majority Prediction and I can Not
Compute Macro-F1 in This Situation; Hence I Use “N.A.” to Denote the Performance
in the Table.
since I have similar observations.
In general, with the increase of α and β, I observe similar patterns: first increasing,
reaching its peak value and then degrading rapidly. These patterns can be used to
determine the optimal value of α and β for SCOUT in practice. In particular it can
be observed,
• When α is increased from zero, eliminating the impact of user-user correlations
to SCOUT, to 0.1, the performance improves, suggesting the importance of
user-user correlations in the proposed framework to mitigate the data sparsity
problem.
• When β is increased from zero, eliminating the impact of post-post correlations
to SCOUT, to 0.01, the performance improves, suggesting the importance of
post-post correlations in the proposed framework.
• SCOUT achieves its best performance when α = 0.1 and β = 0.01, fur-
ther demonstrating the importance of user-user and post-post correlations in
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Figure 3.3: Impact of User-User and Post-Post Correlations on Predicting Religious
Affiliations, Respectively.
SCOUT.
• From α = 0.1 to α = 1000, the performance decreases rapidly. In comparison,
performance decrease is not rapid from β = 0.01 to β = 1000. When α and β is
very large, user-user and post-post correlations dominate the learning process
and the learned representation is inaccurate. For example, when α → +∞
β → +∞, I will obtain a trivial solution, all Ui for (1 ≤ i ≤ n) are exactly the
same.
In summary appropriate incorporation of user-user and post-post correlations into
the dimension reduction algorithm can greatly improve the prediction performance
of personal attributes.
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3.4 Summary
In order to secure users’ privacy, researchers have been exploring different cues to
show users vulnerabilities against privacy attacks. Unlike these methods, my focus
is on predicting personal attributes from publicly available interactions alone so that
users can secure privacy. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to address
this problem. I provide a way to mitigate the sparsity problem of public interaction
data with the help of social theories and propose a novel framework, SCOUT, to
predict users’ personal attributes from public interaction data. The evaluation of the
proposed framework with the real-word data from Facebook page shows that users’
attributes are predictable.
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Chapter 4
LITERATURE REVIEW
User privacy on a social networking site has received considerable attention re-
cently. Gross and Acquisti [31] evaluate the amount of information disclosed through
a social networking site and study usage of privacy settings. This work revealed that
only a few users change the default privacy preferences on Facebook. Narayanan
and Shmatikov [55, 56] show that users are not well protected on a social networking
site by successfully deannonymizing network data solely based on network topol-
ogy. They also highlight the fact that privacy laws are inadequate, confusing, and
inconsistent amongst nations making social networking sites more vulnerable. Won-
dracek et al. [79] propose a simple deanonymization scheme which exploits the group
membership information to breach users privacy. They also pointed out that, so-
cial network data aggregation projects such as OpenID1, DataPortability2, the social
graph project3, and various microformats4 potentially represent a greater threat to
an individual privacy.
Liu and Maes [46] point towards lack of privacy awareness and find large number
of social network profiles in which people describe themselves using a rich vocabulary
of their passions and interests. This fact strengthen the need for vulnerability research
on a social networking site to make users aware of privacy risks. Krishnamurthy and
Wills [42] discuss the problem of leakage of personally identifiable information and
how it can be misused by third parties [56]. Ho et al. [36] discover three privacy
1http://openid.net/
2http://www.dataportability.org/
3http://bradfitz.com/social-graph-problem/
4http://microformats.org/
66
problems on most social networking sites. First, users are not notified by social
networking sites when their personal information is at risk. Second, existing privacy
protection tools are not flexible enough. Finally, users cannot prevent information
that may reveal private information about themselves from being uploaded by any
other user. These observations validate the index estimation method proposed in the
Chapter 2.
There has been some research which suggests the fundamental changes to social
networking sites to achieve user privacy. Squicciarini et al. [69] introduce a novel col-
lective privacy mechanism for better managing the shared content between the users.
Fang and LeFevre [21] focus on helping users to express simple privacy settings but
they have not considered additional problems such as attribute inference [82], or
shared data ownership [69]. Zheleva and Getoor [82] show how an adversary can ex-
ploit an online social network with a mixture of public and private user profiles to pre-
dict the private attributes of users. Baden et al. [6] present a framework where users
dictate who may access their information and based on public-private encryption-
decryption algorithms. Although the proposed framework address privacy concerns,
it comes at the cost of increased response time from a social networking site. Pro-
posed work does not suggest any fundamental changes to social networking sites. I
find users can secure user privacy by unfriending the vulnerable friends. Unfriending5
has been studied recently but I am the first one to propose unfriending to reduce the
vulnerability of a user.
Psychologists have long been predicting user traits and attributes based on various
types of information such as samples of written text [22], answers to psychometric
tests [14], or the appearances of places people inhibit [30]. Most of these researches
are based on an assumption that users have tendencies to inadvertently leave behind
5http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/fashion/24Studied.html
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cues which correlate with their personal attributes. Recently computer scientists are
also exploring users’ personal attributes based on cues from the web, such as user’s
web site browsing logs [54, 37, 17, 26], contents of personal web sites [51], and music
collections [64].
Social media popularity has created several opportunities for users to create data.
Massive amount of social media data has attracted attention of privacy researchers to
identify, measure and mitigate the risks of predicting personal attributes [39, 53, 62,
13, 60, 28, 44, 11]. Jernigan and Mistree [39] shows that location within a friendship
network at Facebook is predictive of sexual orientation. Mislove et.al. proposed a
method of inferring user attributes that is inspired by examining the normalized con-
ductance of the existing friend lists, whose value ranges from -1 to 1, with strongly
positive values indicating significant community structure. Prior studies of social
network graphs have found that normalized conductance values greater than 0.2 cor-
respond to strong communities, that could be detected fairly accurately by community
detection algorithms [53]. Rao et al. [63] predicts gender from tweet texts alone using
an N-gram only model and hand-crafted sociolinguistic-based features. Conover et
al. [12] proposed several methods for predicting the political alignment of Twitter
users based on the content and structure of their political communication in the run-
up to the 2010 U.S. midterm election. Quercia et al. [60] found a positive correlation
between number of followers/following and age. Golbeck et al. [29] used LIWC fea-
tures over a sample of 167 Facebook volunteers as well as profile information and
found limited success of a regression model in predicting personality of a user. Li et
al. [44] profile users’ location by integrating both friendship and content information
in a probabilistic model.
An inspiring work from Kosinski et.al. [41] shows that wide variety of people’s
highly sensitive personal attributes can be automatically and accurately inferred us-
68
ing the variety of Facebook likes. Personal attributes include sexual orientation,
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use
of addictive substances, parental separation, age and gender. Conclusions in this
work are based on the Facebook users personal data which includes their Facebook
likes, detailed demographic profiles, and results of several psychometric tests. Chap-
ter 3 assume that users’ personal data is not available, as the data visibility can be
controlled using users’ profile settings. The focus of this Chapter is on a novel type of
data which is not only publicly available but also beyond the control of users’ profile
settings. The proposed framework SCOUT aims to explore personal attributes from
such data so that users can secure themselves against privacy attacks. Table 4 sum-
marizes literature work on prediction of private attributes. It also shows the required
data for successfully identification of those attributes. Social media related work is
highlighted in bold.
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Table 4.1: Summarization of Literature Work on Prediction of Private Attributes. Social Media Related Work is High-
lighted in Bold
Private Attributes/Traits Required Data for Prediction
Gender Chat messages [43], Web-pages and their browsing history [37], Web-search query logs [40], Lin-
guistic features from tweets [63] and Facebook posts [61], Web-pages’ browsing his-
tory [17, 26], Statistical features alone from Twitter [60], Full names, profiles and con-
tents from Twitter [9], Statistical and content features from Twitter [3], Facebook
likes [41], First-names in Twitter [47]
Age Web-pages and their browsing history [37], Web-search query logs [40], Linguistic features from
tweets [63], Web-pages’ browsing history [17, 26], Statistical features alone from Twit-
ter [60], Statistical and content features from Twitter [3], Facebook likes [41]
Location Web-search query logs [40], Visual, textual and temporal features from Flickr photos [16], GPS his-
tory data [84, 83], Linguistic features from tweets [63], Facebook network and address [5],
Tweet content [35], Check-in data from Gowalla and Brightkite [10], Cell-phone location
trace data [68, 10]
Relationship Status Facebook likes [41]
Social Security Numbers location and date of birth [2]
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – Continued from previous page
Private Attributes/Traits Required Data for Prediction
Religious views Facebook likes [41]
Political views Music Preferences [64], Linguistic features from tweets [63], Profile, network, statistical
and content features from Twitter [59], Twitter follower network [27], Tweet con-
tent and communication network [13, 12], Statistical and content features from Twit-
ter [3],Facebook likes [41], Twitter retweets [80]
Sexual orientation Facebook network [39], Facebook likes [41]
Occupation Web-pages’ browsing history [17]
Education level Web-pages’ browsing history [26], Web-pages’ browsing history [17]
Household Income Web-pages’ browsing history [26]
Ethnicity Linguistic features from Facebook posts [61], Profile, network, statistical and content
features from Twitter [59], Web-pages’ browsing history [26], Facebook likes [41]
Intelligence Facebook likes [41]
Happiness Cell-phone call logs [19], Facebook likes [41]
Use of addictive substance Facebook likes [41]
Continued on next page
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Table 4.1 – Continued from previous page
Private Attributes/Traits Required Data for Prediction
Parental Separation Facebook likes [41]
Social ties Cell-phone call logs [19], Photo and music related tagging data from Flickr and
Last.fm [65], Spatio-temporal features from Flickr photos [15]
Size and density of the friendship
network
Facebook likes [41]
Big Five Personality Traits
(Openness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Neuroticism)
Music Preferences [64], Personal web-pages and visitors’ ratings [51], Statistical and content
features from Twitter [28] and Facebook profiles [29], Statistical features alone from
Twitter [60], Facebook likes [41]
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, I systematically studied how one can manage their vulnera-
bilities on a social networking sites. Based on profile settings and amount of available
information, users are categorized into four types: (1) active users with public set-
tings (Q1 users), (2) active users with private settings (Q2 users), (3) inactive users
with public settings (Q3 users), and (4) inactive users with private settings (Q4 usres)
(Please refer Figure 1.1 for details). For each of these types of users, vulnerability
can be managed in three steps: (1) identifying, (2) measuring and (3) reducing a user
vulnerability. The main focus of this dissertation is on active users only i.e. Q1 and
Q2 users.
Chapter 2 entirely focuses on managing vulnerability of Q1 users. Since rich lit-
erature is available on identifying Q1 users vulnerabilities, this chapter provided a
novel way to measure a Q1 user’s vulnerability on a social networking site, and then
proposed a way to mitigate its vulnerability while retaining social utility value. I
proposed a feasible approach to a novel problem of identifying a user’s vulnerable
friends on a social networking site. This work differs from existing work addressing
social networking privacy by introducing a vulnerability-centered approach to a user
security on a social networking site. On most social networking sites, privacy related
efforts have been concentrated on protecting individual attributes only. However,
users are often vulnerable through community attributes. Unfriending vulnerable
friends can help protect users against the security risks. Based on this study of over
2 million users, I find that users are either not careful or not aware of security and
privacy concerns of their friends. The proposed model clearly highlights the impact
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of each new friend on a user’s privacy. The proposed unfriending-based mechanism
does not require the structural change of a social networking site and aims to maxi-
mally reduce a user’s vulnerability while minimizing his social utility loss. The work
formulated a novel problem of constrained vulnerability reduction suggests a feasible
approach, and demonstrated that the problem of constrained vulnerability reduction
is solvable.
Chapter 3 focused on understanding vulnerabilities of Q2 users. To the best of my
knowledge, little is known about the vulnerabilities of Q2 users before this dissertation
work. Similar to Q1 users, the aim of this chapter is to identify the vulnerabilities of
Q2 users which is achieved by predicting personal attributes from publicly available
unprotected interactions alone. I provided a way to mitigate the sparsity problem of
public interaction data with the help of social theories and proposed a novel frame-
work, SCOUT, to predict users’ personal attributes from public interaction data. The
evaluation of the proposed framework with the real-word data from Facebook page
showed that users’ attributes are predictable. This work paves the way for many
exiting work including measuring and mitigating vulnerabilities of Q2 users.
There are many extensions and work that are worth further explorations. I sum-
marize the future work as below
5.1 User’s Vulnerability Across Platforms
Throughout this dissertation, I focused exclusively on a single social networking
platform for managing one’s vulnerability. Often a user has multiple accounts on
different social media sites, and is unaware of how much information about her can
be publicly available for everybody. Although such information about a user can be
challenging to garner at one place, it aids attribute prediction frameworks and there
by making user’s more vulnerable.
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As a preliminary study, I designed a novel web based tool [34] for collecting at-
tribute values of interest associated with a particular social media user. I refer to
these attributes as Provenance Attributes and the tool as Provenance Data Collector.
Currently this tool is designed to assist social media users to collect provenance data
of more than half a billion Twitter users 1, and more than a billion Facebook users 2.
Provenance data collector 3 is an online data collection tool focusing on efficiently
retrieving useful attribute values of a given Twitter or Facebook user. This tool
features an intuitive user interface and is designed to enable fast retrieval of a maxi-
mum number of desired provenance attributes. If some desired provenance attributes
are uncertain, the tool provides best possible URL (Uniform Resource Locator) to
help users further their findings. In addition to provenance attributes, the tool also
presents other attribute values and related images during the search, and measures
to evaluate efficiency of the system. Figure 5.1 shows an overview of the tool for col-
lecting provenance attribute values. The user vulnerability research can be expanded
by examining the impact of such tools on a user’s vulnerability. I think protecting
against vulnerabilities arising from multiple platforms is a big challenge.
5.2 Exploring Inactive Users with Private Settings
Next challenge for vulnerability research is to identify the vulnerability of inactive
users with private settings. There are two way to explore this problem. The first
way is to exploit the unique features in the usenames alone to identify a vulnerability,
whereas as other way is to obtain more information about inactive users across social
media sites. Recent research has shown that often users are more active on one social
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook
3The provenance data collector tool is located at http://blogtrackers.fulton.asu.edu/Prov_
Attr, and demonstration video can be found at http://www.screencast.com/t/XujEYbBXBKBd
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Figure 5.1: Web Interface of the Provenance Data Collector Tool Showing Attribute
Values of President Barack Obama (@barackobama)
networking site than another [67]. Also, usernames alone have been used to connect
unique users across social media sites [81].
5.3 Identifying Passive Attackers
Using the proposed vulnerability work, one can identify friends whose actions can
potentially compromise a user privacy. Let us assume that a user is doing the most by
effectively employing the profile settings to keep her personal data private. However,
there still exist passive attackers who can breach a user’s privacy. Passive privacy
attackers are those who just want to harvest real friends to increase their credibility
and used them later to target one’s privacy. There are three possible cases using which
a passive attacker can compromise a user’s privacy: (1) a passive attacker becomes a
friend with a user; (2) a passive attacker becomes a friend with a user’s friend; and
(3) a passive attacker is outside of a user’s 2-hop network.
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In the first case, a user is completely compromised as she trusts a passive attacker
by becoming a friend. This case further strengthen an experimental finding that less
vulnerable users can become more vulnerable if they are careless when making new
friends. The proposed vulnerability approach can only be able to identify such at-
tackers if they involved in exposing a user’s private information to others. Hoiwever,
proactive approaches need to be investigated and designed to mitigate the vulnerabil-
ity arising from a passive attacker if he is assumed to be an on-line but not real-world
friend of a user. Currently in such situation, a user can form a social circles of friends
based on the ties in the on-line and real world. A user can then selectively share sen-
sitive information among its social circles. Another approach of dealing with the first
case is that behavioral patterns of friends can be investigated to automatically detect
the passive privacy attackers. However, this approach will be ineffective if a passive
attacker exhibit the behavioral patterns similar to those friends who are minimally
exposing others.
The second case often arises when a user’s friend is less careful in establishing
a new friend connection. The proposed approach is more likely to identify such
vulnerable friend as she is less careful about her own as well as friends privacy. A
user can also notify his vulnerable friends about potential risks and request them to
take necessary actions. In this case the risk of accessing a user’s private information
is less in comparison with the first case. From the privacy perspective, the third case
is the best possible scenario in comparison with the other two. Using the proposed
approach user can periodically measure vulnerability. If a user observes a rise in
vulnerability, she can notify his friends about recent actions which causes the increase
in her vulnerability. This approach can help a user to keep passive attacker from
infiltrating 2-hop network.
Social networking sites like Facebook and GooglePlus can also help in detecting
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such passive privacy attackers by analyzing their browsing (clicking) behavior [77].
Assumption here is that passive attackers are goal oriented and involved in a distinc-
tive browsing patterns than normal users.
5.4 Extending User Vulnerability to Cope with Identity Theft
The proposed definition of a user vulnerability is based on the visibility and ex-
posure of a users profile through not only attributes settings but also his friends. We
measure a user vulnerability using three factors: (1) users privacy settings that can
reveal personal information; (2) a users action on a social networking site that can
expose their friends personal information; and (3) friends action on a social network-
ing site that can reveal users personal information. In other words, the proposed
vulnerability measure provides how much risk to privacy a user is due to her and
friends actions.
Besides the actions of a user and friends, a user is also vulnerable to other types
of privacy attacks such as identity theft or cloning. If a cloned user is involved in
exposing a normal user’s profile, then the proposed vulnerability measure can be
able to direct to the origin of such attack. Otherwise, the proposed solution can not
be able to identify a cloned user. However, a social networking site like Facebook
can play a significant role in detecting a cloned user, as they are expecting to have
different browsing (click) activities [77] in comparison with the normal users. Hence,
further investigation needed to extend existing user vulnerability approaches to handle
identity thefts or cloning attacks.
5.5 Measuring and Reducing Vulnerability of Active Users with Private Settings
In Chapter 3, I successfully demonstrate a method to predict personal attributes
of active users with private settings. This paves the way to the next important
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task of measuring and reducing vulnerabilities of such users. One way of reducing
such vulnerabilities is by providing more control to users’ so that they can control
their profile settings. However such profile settings requires social networking sites
to change their existing architecture and also limits users’ social behavior. The other
way of reducing vulnerabilities is to diversify user’s activities so that the framework
proposed in chapter 3 can not extract patterns and failed to predict the personal
attributes.
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